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This paper analyses how the central bank’s role in the monetary institutional setting can 
affect the unification process of the overall financial supervision architecture. Using 
indicators of monetary commitment and central bank independence, we claim that these 
legal proxies show an inverse link with financial supervision unification. Therefore, the 
trade off still holds between the supervisory and the central bank involvement per se, 
however, monetary commitment and independence do also matter. In this respect, in an 
institutional setting characterized by a central bank deeply and successfully involved in 
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This paper presents an analysis of the relationship between the recent movement 
towards full consolidation in financial supervision and the institutional role of the 
central bank. We propose a path dependence approach to study the single-authority 
versus multi-authority dilemma, considering the level of financial supervision 
consolidation as the dependent variable. The work can be useful for evaluating the 
current worldwide situation, using a sample of 48 countries.  
The starting point is the increasing integration of the banking, securities and 
insurance markets, as well as their products and instruments (blurring effect)
1. The 
blurring effect produced the crisis of the traditional sectoral approach to supervision, 
denoting that a country’s financial system is overseen on a sector – by – sector basis. 
The financial blurring process seems to call for unification of supervision (single 
financial authority, SFA).  
The success of the SFA model seems to be growing, particularly in the European 
area. Among the 15 old members of the European Union, Austria (2002), Belgium 
(2004), Denmark (1988), Germany (2002), Sweden (1991), and the UK (1997) have 
chosen to delegate the supervision to a single authority, different from the central bank. 
The single supervisor has been adopted also in four new EU member countries – 
Estonia (1999), Hungary (2000), Latvia (1998), Malta (2002) – as well as in Norway 
(1986) and Iceland (1988). Outside Europe a unified agency was established in 
Kazakhstan (2004), Korea (1997), Japan (2001) and Nicaragua (1999) and, among the 
small countries, in Bahrain, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, Maldives, 
Netherlands Antilles, Singapore and United Arab Emirates. On the other hand, in 
Ireland (2003) the supervisory responsibilities were concentrated in the hands of the 
central bank.  
However, the picture would be incomplete without recognizing the counter-
evidence. Masciandaro (2004) showed that the two most frequent supervisory models 
are polarized: on the one hand, countries with a high unification of powers display a 
low central bank involvement in supervision (Single Financial Authority Regime); on 
the other hand, countries with a low concentration of powers are characterized by high 
                                                 
1   See, among others, European Commission (2002), De Luna Martinez and Rose (2003), Zwet 
(2003). 
  2central bank supervisory responsibilities (Central Bank Dominated Multiple 
Supervisors Regime).  
What drives financial supervision reform? Which is the central bank’s role in 
this process? Masciandaro (2005) highlighted empirically the existence of a trade off 
between supervision unification and central bank involvement, the so-called central 
bank fragmentation effect, while Masciandaro (2006) discussed this effect using three 
different potential explanations: moral hazard effect, bureaucracy effect and reputation 
endowment effect. If a low central bank involvement is the status quo, the policymaker 
is not likely to increase it, to avoid moral hazard phenomena in the controlled 
intermediaries (moral hazard effect), or an increase in the bureaucratic powers of the 
central bank (bureaucracy effect). An increased unification level may be achieved by 
creating a new single financial authority. 
If a high central bank involvement is the status quo, the policymaker may not 
wish to unify the supervision in the hands of the central bank for the same reasons 
(moral hazard and bureaucracy effects). At the same time, the policymaker may not be 
in a position to establish a new single financial authority, reducing the central bank 
involvement in supervision, if the central bank’s reputation is high (reputation 
endowment effect).  
In the paper, we go a little further and try to explain the reasons behind the 
central bank fragmentation effect and the corresponding effects. Parallel to the blurring 
effect in the financial markets, central banks all over the world have gained an 
increasing degree of independence from the political process. We identify legal proxies 
of two different potential causes, namely bureaucracy effect and reputation endowment 
effect, that could explain the decision of the policymaker to maintain or reform the 
supervision responsibility of the monetary authority. We wish to test the hypothesis 
that, when supervision is assigned to central banks, the central banker enjoys a higher 
degree of bureaucratic power and/or reputation endowment owing to central bank 
independence. For this purpose we adopt monetary commitment and central bank 
independence indexes, using and elaborating the indicators discussed in Freytag (2001). 
It is not surprising to discover that monetary legal indicators - and particularly 
the central bank independence - matter. In industrialised countries the relationship 
between independence and control over inflation seemed sufficiently robust and 
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Here we focus on the possible role of monetary legal indicators as institutional 
determinants of the choice of a financial supervisory structure. The policy implications 
are also relevant, particularly in the European Union context: Does the current existence 
of an independent European Central Bank affect the likelihood of the creation of a 
Single European Financial Supervisor?  
The paper is organized as follows. Section two presents a path dependence approach 
to study the single authority versus multi-authority dilemma, considering the level of 
financial supervision consolidation as the dependent variable. The financial authorities 
concentration index (FAC Index) is used in section three to identify this dependent 
variable. In section three we highlight the importance of the role the central bank plays 
in the various national supervisory settings, using the fact that the degree of supervision 
unification seems to be inversely correlated with the central bank’s involvement in 
supervision itself as a starting point. Section four discusses the possible explanation of 
this trade-off, stressing three potential causes: moral hazard effect, bureaucracy effect 
and reputation endowment effect. Section five introduces monetary commitment and 
central bank independence indicators as consistent proxies of the reputation endowment 
effect and bureaucracy effect respectively. In section six, an econometric analysis is 
performed. Section seven puts forward some conclusions as well as perspectives for 
further research. 
 
2. Explaining the Financial Supervision Regime: A Path Dependence Approach 
Goodhart (2004) wondered if the development of financial supervision architecture 
is designed or accidental. It has been argued regularly and frequently that the design of 
supervision is essentially reactive, lagging behind innovation and evolving risks, and 
that the reasons for supervisory reforms are largely political. We claim that the 
evolution of financial supervision is not accidental. To justify this, we investigate the 
determinants that should lead a country to reform or to maintain the supervisory regime, 
with particular attention to the role of the central bank. 
Our basis is that in each point of time, gains and losses of a supervisory model are 
expected  variables, calculated by the policymakers that maintain or reform the 
supervisory regime. But the expectations of policymakers are likely to be influenced by 
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country. Therefore, given the national economic and institutional endowment, these 
variables can determine, ceteris paribus, the policymaker’s expected gains or losses of a 
specific supervisory regime. The supervisory regime can become the dependent variable 
in a path dependence framework. Furthermore, economic agents do not have perfect 
information on the true preferences of the policymaker: his/her optimal degree of   
supervision unification is a hidden variable. 
The crucial issue is the identification of the policymaker’s preferences. In the 
economic literature, there is lack of theoretical studies that consider the policymaker’s 
objective function for the financial supervisory design. The first approach to identify the 
policymaker’s utility function could be the so-called narrative approach, in which 
official documents are interpreted to gauge the policymaker’s choices. The narrative 
approach has been extensively used in the monetary policy literature: see Potts and 
Luckett (1978), Wallace and Warner (1985), Hakes (1988 and 1990), Romer and Romer 
(1989). This approach has the drawback that there is substantial room for differences 
between the policymaker’s announcements and his/her true preferences. 
The approach we intend to follow here is to consider the policymaker’s actual 
choices in determining the level of financial supervision unification (factual approach). 
In each random point of time, we observe the policymaker’s decision to maintain or 
reform the financial supervision architecture, choosing the level of unification. In other 
words we consider policymakers faced with discrete choices.  
Building an empirical analysis consistent with this discrete choice process in a 
cross-country perspective involves claiming the existence of unobservable 
policymaker’s utilities Uij, where each Uij is the utility received by the ith national 
policymaker from the jth level of financial unification. Since the utility Uij is 
unobservable, we represent it as a random quantity, assuming that it is composed of a 
systematic part U and an random error term ε. 
Furthermore, we claim that the utilities Uij are a function of the attributes of the 
alternative institutional level of financial unification and of the structural characteristics 
of the policymaker’s country.  
  5Combining the two hypotheses, we have a random utility framework for the 
unobservable financial unification variable. As usual, we assume that the errors εij are 
independent for each national policymaker and institutional alternative, as well as 
normally distributed. The independence assumption implies that the utility derived by 
one national policymaker is not related to the utility derived by any other national 
policymaker, and that the utility that a policymaker derives from the choice of a given 
level of financial consolidation is not related to the utility provided by the other 
alternative. In the factual approach the first crucial issue is the measurement of the 
policymaker’s choices, that is the definition of the dependent variable.  
 
3. Financial Supervision Unification and Central Bank Involvement 
The first problem when considering financial supervision concentration as a 
dependent variable, is to construct this variable. How can the degree of concentration of 
financial supervision powers be measured? To this end we use the financial authorities 
concentration index (FAC Index, Table 1B) proposed in Masciandaro (2004)
2. The 
index has the maximum score (7) in countries where all the supervision responsibilities 
are in the hands of a single agency, this can be a new financial services authority – as in 
the UK or Germany – or the central bank – as in Ireland. Symmetrically, the index takes 
the minimum score (1) in countries with highly fragmentised supervisory regimes – as 
in the US or France. 
But we should also consider the nature of the institutions involved in supervisory 
responsibilities, focusing on the distinction between the central bank and any other form 
of institution at least for two reasons. 
First of all, any supervisory regime will have to provide a link between supervision 
and the central bank, given the potential relationship between monetary stability and 
financial stability. It has been pointed out correctly (Llewellyn 2005) that, irrespective 
of its role, the central bank is the ultimate authority for the systemic stability of the 
payment system. Thus, among the authorities that can have supervisory responsibility, 
the central bank has a special nature being the institution responsible for monetary 
policy. Furthermore, the special characteristics of the role played by the central bank 
                                                 
2   The construction of the index is described in Appendix 8.1. 
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intermediaries, and the other control authorities. 
Secondly, in a movement towards full consolidation in supervision, one can think of 
two sharp alternatives: a monopolistic central bank or a pure single financial authority. 
In fact the policymaker can choose to delegate the management of monetary policy as 
well as financial supervision to the central bank. The second type of delegation 
separates the conduct of monetary policy from financial supervision, establishing a pure 
single financial authority. 
The debate on the characteristics of this link is particularly important in the 
European Union, where monetary policy is separated from financial supervision; See 
Lannoo (2000), Padoa Schioppa (2003), Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995), Eijffinger 
(2001), Vives (2001), Goodhart, Schoenmaker and Dasgupta (2002). Therefore we must 
ask which role the central bank plays in the various national supervisory regimes. We 
use the index of the central bank's involvement in financial supervision: the Central 
Bank as Financial Authority Index (CBFA, Table 1B) also proposed in Masciandaro 
(2004)
3. 
Note that in evaluating the role of the central bank in banking supervision, we 
consider the fact that, whatever the supervision regime is, the monetary authority has 
responsibility in pursuing the macro financial stability. The central bank can be 
involved in banking supervision tasks in Single Authority regimes, too. For example in 
Germany the Deutsche Bundesbank participates in banking supervision, in 
subordination to the Bundesanstalt fuer Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin)’s issues. 
The Oesterreichische Nationalbank co-operates with the Austrian Financial Market 
Authority continuing to conduct on-site inspection. The Estonian Bank has no role in 
supervision, but its President is a member of the Financial Authority Board, and two 
other members are chosen by the central bank. In the other cases, the central bank 
remains involved in pursuing the overall financial stability. Therefore, we choose as rule 
of thumb the relative role of the central bank: we assign a greater value – if the central 
bank is the unique or the main responsible for banking supervision. 
                                                 
3 The construction of the index is described in Appendix 8.1. 
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central bank involvement provide a general picture of the supervisory regimes around 
the world. In fact, each national supervisory regime can be identified with at least two 
characteristics: the degree of concentration of powers (FAC Index) and the degree of 
involvement of the central bank in that distribution of powers (CBFA Index). From a 
theoretical point of view, given the two possible choices of the policymaker highlighted 
above, we can observe the relationship between the FAC Index and the CBFA Index. 
The worldwide comparative picture is quite interesting. The two most frequent models 
are polarized: on the one hand, countries with a high unification of powers show a low 
central bank involvement (Single Financial Authority Regime); on the other hand, in 
countries with a low concentration of powers, the central bank is highly involved 
(Central Bank Dominated Multiple Supervisors Regime).  
The descriptive evidence of the two most frequent financial supervision regimes 
seems to correct the idea that, given the blurring process in the financial landscape, 
there are two possible kinds of supervisory approach: 1) unification under the roof of 
the central bank; and 2) unification in a different supervisory body. Actually the 
unification of supervision seems more evident in the case of Single Financial 
Authorities Regimes, while in the case of Central Bank-Dominated Multiple 
Supervisors Regimes the approach seems more consistent with a “leader-followers” 
framework. It is a matter of fact that in a multi-authority model the central bank tends 
to assume the position of “first among peers”, at least for historical reasons. In other 
words, the descriptive analysis shows an interesting result: the national choice on how 
many agencies must be involved in supervision is strictly linked to the role of the 
central bank. The degree of supervision unification seems to be inversely correlated 
with central bank involvement (central bank fragmentation effect).  
 
4. Beyond the Central Bank Involvement in Supervision? The Role of Monetary 
Commitment and Central Bank Independence  
How do we explain this fragmentation effect given by the involvement of the 
central bank in supervision?  
  8We claimed that the central bank fragmentation effect can be explained as a special 
case of rule-driven path dependence. The concept of rule driven path dependence has 
been recently used in the corporate governance literature: see among others, Bebchuk 
and Roe (2000), Clark and Wojcik (2003). Rule-driven path dependence exists when, 
other conditions being equal, the choice of a given design of rules depends on 
characteristics already existing or already determined by the rules themselves.  
In this case, a given policymaker’s choice of supervision concentration level will 
depend on the role the central bank plays in the supervision, or that the policymaker 
has decided to have the central bank play. In other words, the policymaker’s choice can 
be viewed as a sequential process in which the institutional status quo matters: the 
supervision concentration level is decided on the basis of the current position of the 
central bank. If the role of the central bank is limited, the supervision concentration 
level will probably be high and vice versa. 
 
4.1 Low Central Bank Involvement in Supervision 
Let us first consider the case where the central bank’s involvement is low. The 
policymaker might raise the supervision concentration level by increasing the 
involvement of the central bank. The supervision concentration level and the central 
bank involvement would thus move in the same direction, but this does not seem to be 
the case. Why? 
First of all, the policymaker may not wish to involve the central bank in 
supervisory responsibilities, as to avoid moral hazard phenomena in the controlled 
intermediaries (moral hazard effect). In addition, the regulatory office may be prone to 
regulatory capture. If a central bank is involved into banking supervision, capture may 
have significant negative effects on monetary policy (Heinemann and Schuler 2004). 
Or the policymaker may wish to avoid increasing the bureaucratic powers of the 
central bank, since it is already responsible for monetary policy (bureaucracy effect). 
Thus, in the case of a central bank not involved in supervision, the increased 
supervision concentration level may be achieved by creating a single financial 
authority.  
  9Moreover, the policymaker may fear that the safety net – the central bank’s 
function of lender of last resort – might spread to a wider set of institutions than just 
banks, if the central bank is also involved in supervising insurance and securities firms 
(moral hazard effect). Furthermore, in a country where the central bank is deeply 
involved in supervision, the policymakers might fear the creation of an overly powerful 
bureaucratic agency (bureaucracy effect). The policymaker may therefore not wish to 
increase the involvement of the central bank. 
In the United Kingdom case, it has been stressed that, among all the arguments that 
led the Government in 1997 to establish the Financial Services Authority (FSA), 
removing supervision from the Bank of England could have been a quid pro quo for 
giving it monetary independence, on the grounds that a central bank with too many 
functions could be too much of a power centre within the democratic system. In 
Norway, due to the banking crisis in the early 1990s, the possibility of merging the 
BISC with the central bank was considered by a committee appointed by the Ministry 
of Finance. But the Parliament, in order to avoid an excessive concentration of power, 
ruled that the BISC should continue as a separate and independent agency . 
Austria adopted unified financial supervision in April 2002. In banking 
supervision, the existing powers of the Federal Ministry of Finance and in the 
Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB) were combined under the Financial Market 
Authority (FMA). In Germany, the Federal Financial Services Supervisory Authority 
(BaFin) was established in May 2002 against the explicit preferences of the 
Bundesbank. BaFin replaced the three existing supervisory authorities for banking and 
financial services, insurance companies and securities trading.  
The Danish Financial Supervisory Authority (DFSA) was established in 1988 
through the merger of the Danish Banking Supervisory Authority and the Insurance 
Business Supervisory Authority. The Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority was 
established in 1991 through the merger of the former banking and insurance 
supervisory bodies (Bank Inspection Board and Private Insurance Supervisory Service, 
respectively). In Norway, the Banking, Insurance and Securities Commission (BISC) 
was established in 1986 though a merger of the Banking Inspectorate and the Insurance 
Council.  
  10The Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority was founded in April 2000 by 
merging four supervisory authorities: The State Banking Supervision, the State 
Securities Supervision, the State Supervision on Pension Funds and the State 
Supervision of Insurance Companies. In Japan the Financial Services Agency (FSA) 
was established in 1998, and before that the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan 
were in charge of regulating the banking sector and all aspects of supervision were the 
sole responsibility of the Ministry of Finance. In Belgium, the Banking, Finance and 
Credit Commission was created as a result of the Integration of the Insurance 
Supervisory Authority into the Banking and Financial Commission since 1 January 
2004. 
In all these cases, the central bank was not the main body responsible for banking 
supervision when supervisory reforms took place. 
 
4.2 High Central Bank Involvement in Supervision 
If, on the other hand, the central bank is heavily involved in supervision, the 
policymaker may increase the supervision concentration level in one of the two 
following ways: by increasing the powers of the central bank or by assigning them to a 
new single financial authority. 
Ireland seems to be the typical case of an outlier. The first explanation is that the 
interests of the central bank captured the Government. In October 1998 the Irish 
government approved in principle the establishment of a single supervisory authority 
and also agreed to create an Implementation Advisory Group (IAG) to progress the 
necessary work. The IAG failed to reach a consensus; the Irish Central Bank, with its 
allies in the Department of Finance, wished to continue the central bank as the single 
supervisory agency; the banking sector strongly favoured the retention of the central 
bank as its supervisor. While the IAG report recommended that this single authority 
should be a new independent organization outside the central bank, a minority of the 
group members preferred to locate the new structure within a restructured central bank, 
by establishing a separate division or wing to undertake prudential and consumer 
protection functions. The subsequent government decision, in early 2001, was to link 
monetary policy and related functions with regulation of financial services into a 
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an autonomous department within.  
Alternatively, we could explain the exception noting that, ceteris paribus, the Irish 
central bank, as a member of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), shares 
the monetary responsibilities and prerogatives with other central banks; in other words, 
the central bank of Ireland is not an autonomous national monetary authority. The 
monetary policy of the ESCB is governed by the decision-making bodies of the 
European Central Bank (ECB). The national central banks are an integral part of the 
ESCB and have to act in accordance with the guidelines and instructions of the ECB. 
Therefore, the expected risks of moral hazard effect and bureaucracy effect are likely 
to be smaller in the case of countries which are members of the ESCB. The decisions 
of the Irish Government could be explained without taking into account the capture 
theory.  
At the same time, however, the policymaker may not be in a position to reduce the 
central bank’s level of involvement in supervision, or may not regard it as advisable, 
especially if the policy of the central bank has been effective (reputation endowment 
effect).  
In France, a reform was recently implemented, merging different financial 
supervision responsibilities into one regulatory authority – Autorité des Marchés 
Financiers (AMF) –, however, the Banque de France prerogatives remained 
unchanged. In 2004, after the Parmalat scandal, the Italian Government proposed a 
draft text of a bill, concerning a general reform of the supervisory architecture, based 
on the establishment of a single financial authority (Autorità per la Tutela del 
Risparmio). The text has not been approved by the appropriate Parliamentary 
Committee. The proposed reform encountered strong opposition from a bi-partisan 
coalition, defending the role of the Bank of Italy in promoting financial stability. The 
reform is still subject to discussion.  
Finland has opted not to adopt the unified approach in financial supervision, in 
contrast to the other Scandinavian countries. It has been claimed that the Bank of 
Finland involvement in supervision has to be considered in explaining this choice. In 
Iceland, prior to the establishment of the single financial agency, banking supervision 
was conducted by the central bank. In 1996, a committee was set up by the Minister of 
Commerce, to look at prospects of moving towards unified supervision, given the 
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the central bank official – voted against the introduction of unified financial 
supervision. However, the central bank obtained the ability to appoint one of the three 
members of the single financial authority board. 
Since the policymaker has decided (or was unable to decide) neither to increase 
nor to reduce central bank involvement, he/she also decides not to increase the level 
of supervision concentration. In case the central bank is heavily involved in 
supervision, there is a tendency not to increase the level of supervision concentration.  
On the contrary, if the reputation of the central bank is low, or decreasing, the 
establishment of a single financial authority could be more likely to occur, despite its 
high involvement in supervision. In the UK the Johnson-Matthey failure, the Bank of 
Credit and Commerce International case of 1991 and the Barings case of 1995 were 
interpreted by the public as being responsibilities of the Bank of England. The conduct 
of banking supervision had not enhanced the reputation of the central bank; each 
failure led to polemic debates, the establishment of a formal enquiry in two cases and, 
finally, a new banking supervision act, creating the FSA. In Sweden the creation of the 
single financial authority was prompted by the banking crisis that hit the country in 
1990-1991. 
The link between banking instability, central bank reputation failure and single 
financial authority establishment is also evident in the Baltic unified supervisory 
architectures and in the case of Korea. Estonia experienced a severe banking crisis in 
1998 and 1999. In May 2001, the Estonian Parliament adopted the Financial 
Supervisory Authority. Before the Act, the supervision was split into the three 
traditional sets of institutions (banking, securities and insurance). The Bank of Estonia 
was responsible for state supervision of banking. Latvia experienced banking and 
financial crises in 1995 and in 1998. In July 2001, the Financial and Capital Market 
Commission was established, as a consolidated institution replacing the Bank of Latvia 
as the credit institutions’ supervisor, the Securities Market Commission, the Insurance 
Supervision Inspectorate. In Korea, until 1997, the central bank was responsible for 
banking supervision. Following the 1997 financial crisis, a presidential committee 
recommended a drastic overhaul of the organization of the central bank and the 
country’s supervisory structure. As a result, the former four financial supervisory 
  13authorities were combined into one integrated financial supervisory body, the Financial 
Supervisory Committee.  
Therefore, the degree of central bank involvement in supervision may influence 
the policymaker in his/her decision to alter the supervision concentration effect, 
according to an inverse relationship: the result may be the central bank fragmentation 
effect. 
 
5. Overall Central Bank Institutional Setting  
However, is it possible to separate the different causes that could explain the 
importance of the role that the central bank plays in supervision? In general, the three 
effects explaining the policymaker’s path dependent behaviour can depend on the 
central banker’s past behaviour or on the legal features. In other words, the relevance 
of the central bank involvement in supervision may hide the role of the central 
banker’s past performances or the key aspects of the monetary institutional setting. 
The behavioural aspect and the institutional aspect are both potentially important. 
Furthermore, the two aspects are likely to be complementary. 
None of the three effects we distinguish is directly observable. Therefore, we use 
proxies. While the moral hazard effect can be called a purely economic concept, the 
other two are political economy by nature. Thus, in this paper we will concentrate on 
the legal aspect. Following again the rule-driven approach, we can try to identify the 
institutional rules – different from the central bank involvement – that could capture 
the explanations of the central bank fragmentation effect. 
First of all, the central bank’s institutional status quo in supervision matters if the 
monetary authority is characterized by a reputation endowment. The reputation of a 
central bank depends on the supervisory and monetary performance, on the one side, 
and on the overall institutional position, on the other side. Focusing on the legal rules, 
the central bank’s overall institutional position depends on the features of the 
monetary regime. In accordance with the literature as discussed in Freytag (2001), we 
argue that the quality of a monetary regime is reflected by its degree of commitment 
to price stability. We distinguish two related concepts of commitment, which we call 
  14monetary commitment (MOC) and central bank independence (CBI). The coding and 
weighting is presented in Table 1A and commented in Appendix 8.2. 
The index MOC is constructed using several factors, which can be grouped as 
follows: internal restrictions as set by central bank legislation, external constraints 
such as convertibility restriction, exchange rate arrangements and the like. For this 
purpose we propose the index of monetary commitment (MCO Index) (Table 1A), 
which modifies the indicator introduced in Freytag (2001), excluding the information 
on supervision rule. Hence: O ≤ MCO ≤ 1. If the index approaches zero, the level of 
commitment is very low. The highest theoretically possible commitment is expressed 
by the value one. In other words: the higher MCO, the higher the potential overall 
reputation endowment of the central bank. The index is the weighted average of all 
the factors determining legal monetary commitment. These criteria are 
operationalised by using components with discrete outcomes having numerical 
coding between zero and one.  
The central bank legislation rules are covering only the internal dimension of the 
degree of monetary commitment, identifying the specific position of the central 
banker inside the state organization. This is reflected in the measure of central bank 
independence. The concept of central bank independence can capture the 
bureaucratic position of the central bank vis a vis the government, as well as the 
Parliament. Focusing again on the role of the rules, the central bank independence 
can be used to evaluate the specific bureaucracy effect that determines the 
policymaker’s attention on the role of the central bank in defining the supervision 
architecture. On this account we build up an index of central bank independence (CBI 
Index, Table 1A) being consistent with the measures of legal central bank 
independence, which are most influential on the literature, as the indices proposed in 
Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) and in Cukierman (1992). If the index 
approaches zero, the level of independence is very low. The highest theoretically 
possible independence is expressed by the value one. Hence: O ≤ CBI ≤ 1; the higher 
CBI, the higher the specific bureaucratic power of the central bank.  
This leads us to the connection of sections five and six. We develop two 
competing hypotheses which both seem plausible. 
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dimension of the overall central bank reputation endowment. High reputation 
encourages policymakers to give the central bank much authority in supervision. 
Thus, the higher MOC, the higher central bank involvement, the lower FAC. 
•  Second, the degree of central bank independence can be utilized to measure its 
specific legal bureaucratic power. If this power is high, the bank will be 
circumvented by the policymaker and not given a big role in financial authority. 
Therefore, the higher CBI, the lower the bank’s involvement, the higher FAC. 
Furthermore, in order to be rigorous we have to note that monetary commitment 
could be a proxy of both the reputation endowment effect and the bureaucracy effect; 
the same is true for the central bank independence (see the correlation index of 0.96 
below). For these two reasons,  we will use the two variables separately in the 
econometric analyses. 
Summarizing, the institutional position of a central bank can be described using 
three different indicators: the degree of supervision involvement; the degree of 
monetary commitment; the degree of central bank independence. We note that on 
average the degree of supervision involvement is weakly and inversely correlated 
with the degree of monetary commitment (correlation index = - 0.16) and with the 
degree of independence (correlation index = - 0.14) while, not surprisingly,  the 
degree of monetary commitment is strongly and directly correlated with the degree of 
independence (correlation index = 0.96) (Table 6). We have to remember that the 
concept of central bank independence is part of the broader definition of monetary 
commitment; in fact the CBI index is the aggregate of seven of the twelve 
components of the MOC index.   
Note that in the econometric part we will use an index of central bank age 
(CBAGE Index) as alternative proxy of the reputation effect and/or the bureaucratic 
effect; the degree of central bank involvement is also weakly and inversely correlated 
with the central bank age (correlation index = -0.12).  
 
 
  166. Financial Supervision Unification, Monetary Commitment and Central Bank 
Independence 
Each country has its degree of unification of powers with respect to financial 
supervision. The respective index reaches its maximum level in cases where there is a 
single authority and the minimum when there are more than three supervisors. The 
analysis conducted in the preceding pages claims that the degree of central bank 
involvement in supervision may condition the policymaker in his/her decision to alter 
the supervision concentration, according to an inverse relationship: the result is the 
central bank fragmentation effect. 
How do we econometrically test the robustness of the fragmentation effect? How 
can we evaluate the possible role of the monetary commitment or the influence of the 
central bank independence? In order to assess these relationships, we can estimate a 
model of the probability of different regime decisions as a function of these variables, 
controlling for other structural variables.  
The supervision regimes can be viewed as resulting from an unobserved variable: 
the optimal degree of financial supervision concentration, consistent with the 
policymaker utility. Each regime corresponds to a specific range of the optimal 
financial supervision concentration, with higher discrete FAC Index values 
corresponding to a higher range of financial concentration values. Since the FAC 
Index is a qualitative variable, the estimation of a model for such a dependent 
variable requires the use of a specific technique. 
Our qualitative dependent variable can be classified into more than two 
categories, given that the FAC Index is a multinomial variable. But the FAC Index is 
also an ordinal variable, given that it reflects a ranking. Then the ordered probit and 
ordered logit models are appropriate estimators, given the ordered nature of the 
policymaker’s alternative; see Maddala (1983), Greene (1997), Wooldrige (2002). 
Let y be the policymaker’s ordered choices, taking the values (0,1,2,..,7). The 
ordered model for y, conditional on a set of K explanatory variables x, can be derived 
from a latent variable model (Equation 1). In order to test this relationship, let us 
assume that the unobserved variable vector, the optimal degree of financial 
supervision concentration y*, is determined by: 
  17y*=β’ x + ε     (1)  
where ε  is a random disturbance uncorrelated with the regressors, and β is a 1 x 
K regressors’ vector. 
The latent variable y* is unobserved. What is observed is the choice of each 
national policymaker to maintain or to reform the financial supervisory architecture: 
this choice is summarized in the value of the FAC Index, which represents the 
threshold values. For our dependent variable there are seven threshold values. 
Estimation is carried out by means of  maximum likelihood techniques, assuming that 
ε is normally distributed across country observations, and the mean and variance of ε 
are normalized. This model can be estimated with an ordered Probit model or with an 
ordered Logit model
4.  
Which economic model can be tested? First of all, given the recent empirical 
analyses (Masciandaro 2005 and  2006), the choice of the optimal level of financial 
supervision concentration could depend on the role of the central bank in the 
supervision architecture. The expected sign of the relationship between central bank 
involvement and financial supervision consolidation is negative. 
Secondly, we can control for the potential role of the monetary commitment and 
the influence of the central bank independence. In fact, the central bank involvement 
variable may hide the role of the overall monetary commitment, that enforces the 
general reputation endowment of the central bank, or the influence of the central 
bank’s degree of independence, that strengthened its bureaucratic power. Therefore, 
both monetary institutional variables can capture the following effect: does monetary 
commitment and/or central bank independence matter in defining  the level of 
financial supervision consolidation, instead of the central bank involvement in 
supervision? The expected sign of the two relationships is negative.  
How can other control variables be chosen? Following Masciandaro (2005, 2006) 
we shall test the more general hypotheses: 
                                                 
4 The Logit model differs from the Probit model only in the cumulative distribution function that is used 
to define choice probabilities. The maximum likelihood estimations were carried out by a packaged-
ordered Probit and ordered Logit commands in STATA. To be complete we present both the Logit and 
the Probit results, given that, as usual, there is little basis for choosing between Probit and Logit 
models. 
  18First, the policymaker chooses to maintain or reform the degree of supervisory 
concentration in response to the structure of the financial system. In the modern 
debate on financial structure, it is usual to compare the equity dominance model (or 
market-based regime) with the bank dominance model (or bank-based regime). 
Furthermore, recent literature pointed out the close relationship between the financial 
structure model and the corporate governance model in every country, with particular 
attention to the relative political determinants; see Pagano and Volpin (2000), Perotti 
and Von Thadden (2003). Therefore, the control variables must capture the following 
effect: does the financial structure model (financial factor) matter in defining the 
policymaker’s choices in the area of supervisory consolidation?  
The expected sign of the relationship between the degree of supervision 
unification and the financial factor is undetermined (i.e. it can be either positive or 
negative). In section two we stressed the importance of the blurring process for 
banking and financial markets worldwide. In a bank-based regime, if we think that 
the policymakers’ choices depend on the features of their own regime, we can 
suppose a positive relationship between the kind of regime and the degree of 
financial supervision consolidation, exactly in face of the financial conglomerates 
effect. The rationale for the creation of a single financial supervisory authority is the 
blurring of confines between banks, insurers and financial service providers. The 
increasing importance of financial conglomerates requires the unification of 
supervisory functions. At the same time, however, the blurring effect also means 
potential changes in the nature and dimensions of the financial markets (the 
securitisation effect). Therefore, in a market-based regime we can also expect a 
positive relationship between the kind of regime and the degree of financial 
supervision consolidation, this time in the face of the securitisation effect. Therefore 
the relationship between the financial factor and the degree of supervision 
concentration remains an empirical question. 
Second, the political and institutional environment can determine the ability of 
the policymakers to implement their choices. Furthermore, we pointed out that the 
financial structure itself could be influenced by political factors. Then the control 
variables must capture a possible second relevant effect: does the quality of public 
governance (political factor) matter in defining the policymaker’s choices on the 
  19level of supervisory concentration? The expected sign of the relationship between the 
degree of supervision unification and the political factor is also undetermined. In 
section two we noted that, whatever the financial regime of his/her country, a 
policymaker may choose a higher degree of supervision in order to improve the 
capacity to face the challenges of the blurring process. Then we can suppose a 
positive relationship between good governance indicators and supervision 
unification. But a policymaker may prefer a single authority in order to increase the 
probability of capturing the financial supervisory structure. Therefore, at the same 
time we might expect a positive relationship between bad governance indicators and 
supervision consolidation. Again, the relationship between the political factor and the 
degree of supervision concentration remains an empirical question. 
However, we must note that the relationship between the degree of supervision 
consolidation and the characteristics of the banking and financial markets might 
“obscure” the importance of other variables, which are themselves determinants in 
explaining the characteristics of the banking and financial markets; for example, in 
Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven and Levine (2003) regulation becomes non-significant in 
explaining banking performance when checking for institutional indicators. Recently, 
the structure of financial markets was explained with three different institutional 
approaches (legal factors): the “legal approach” - La Porta et al. (1998) - the 
“economic approach” - Rajan and Zingales (2000) - the “political economy 
approach” - Pagano and Volpin (2000), Perotti and von Thadden (2003). Then we 
have to include control variables related to the legal-financial view and the 
endowment view, while the political-financial view was already represented by the 
indicator of governance. 
Finally, as the above descriptive analysis pointed out, the concentration of powers 
seems more peculiar of developed countries, particularly in the European context. 
Moreover, we asked ourselves whether the choices of policymakers to increase the 
degree of consolidation of supervisory powers might depend on the level of 
development in their respective countries (economic factor). Furthermore, the 
geographical factor might also be important, in terms of location in Europe. Then we 
could expect a positive relationship between European location and OECD 
  20membership, as well as the levels of economic growth, on one hand, and financial 
supervision concentration, on the other.  
The general specification is represented by equation (2):  
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The independent variables are the following
5: 
  
1. CBFA Index is the index of involvement of the central bank in supervision, defined in section 
four; 
 2. MCB Index is a monetary institutional variable: we use first the MOC Index (monetary 
commitment), then the CBI Index (central bank independence); both variables were defined in section 
five; 
3. CBFAMCB factor is the composite effect of CBFA Index and MCB Index; 
4. MvB Index = Market vs Bank Index: binary variable for the private governance factor. It is a 
dummy that expresses the financial system of a given country, market-based (1) versus bank-based
 6 (0); 
5. mcap = Market capitalization/GDP: quantitative variable for the private governance factor.  It 
shows a measure of the securities market size, relative to GDP
7;  
6. goodgov = Good Governance: quantitative variable for the public governance factor. It shows the 
structural capacity of the government to formulate and implement sound policies. Furthermore the index 
can represent the control variable for the politics and finance view
8;  
                                                 
5   The correlation matrix for the variables is in Table 2. 
6    The index is calculated using different banking and financial variables: see Demigüç-Kunt and 
Levine (1999). For each variable we calculate the mean of four time values: 1996, 1998, 2000, 
2002.   
7   World Bank (2003). Stock Markets 5.3. For each variable we calculate the mean of four time 
values: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002. Note that the correlation index between the financial regime 
variable (MvB) and the market capitalization variable (mcap) is high, but their influence on the 
dependent variable is very low. 
8   The index is built using all the indicators proposed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003). 
They define (public) governance as the exercise of authority through formal and informal traditions 
and institutions for the common good, thus encompassing: 1) the process of selecting, monitoring 
and replacing governments; 2) the capacity to formulate and implement sound policies and deliver 
public services; 3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and 
social interactions among them. Furthermore, for measurement and analysis purposes, these three 
dimensions of governance can be further unbundled to comprise two measurable concepts per each 
of the dimensions above for a total of six components: 1) voice and external accountability; 2) 
political stability and lack of violence; 3) government effectiveness; 4) lack of regulatory burden; 5) 
rule of law; 6) control of corruption. The authors present a set of estimates of these six dimensions 
of governance for four time periods: 1996, 1998, 2000,2002. For every country, therefore, we first 
calculate the mean of the four time values for each dimension of governance; then we build up an 
  216.  gdp = Gross Domestic Product: quantitative  variable for the economic size factor
9;  
7. OECD = binary variable for the economic factor. It is a dummy that signals whether a given 
country is a member of the OECD (1) or not (0); 
8. Europe = binary variable for the geographical factor. It is a dummy that signals whether a given 
country is European (1) or not (0); 
9-11. AnglosaxonL, FrenchL, GermanScandL = binary variables for the law factor. They are 
dummies that indicate the legal root of a given country, representing the control variables for the law 
and finance view
10; 
12.  Latitude = quantitative variable for the endowment view. The variable is calculated as the 
absolute value of the latitude of the country, scaled to take values between 0 and 1 
11. 
 
In the multinomial ordered models the impact of a change in an explanatory 
variable on the estimated probabilities of the highest and lowest of the order 
classifications - in our case the Single Authority model and the “pure” Multi-
supervisory model - is unequivocal: if βj is positive, for example, an increase in the 
value of xj increases the probability of having the Single Authority model, while it 
decreases the probability of having the “pure” Multi-supervisory model. 
Tables 2 and 3 show the Logit and Probit estimates of the general specification, 
using the sample of 48 countries
12. The result of all the estimates confirm the 
robustness of the role of the central bank involvement, and also the monetary 
commitment (Table 2) and the central bank independence (Table 3) are inversely 
related to the supervision consolidation. The monetary institutional indexes do not 
substitute the central bank involvement effect, but they also influence the supervision 
unification. Therefore, both the central bank’s role as supervisor and its monetary legal 
status matter in explaining the supervisory architectures. However the two factors – 
central bank involvement and central bank monetary status – are independent; the 
composite factor is never significant (Table 2 and 3). 
                                                                                                                                               
index of global good governance in the period 1996-2002, calculating the mean of the six different 
dimensions. 
9   World Bank (2003). For each variable we calculate the mean of four time values: 1996, 1998, 2000, 
2002. 
10   Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001). The legal roots are five: Anglo-Saxon Law (=Common 
Law), French, German and Scandinavian Laws (=Civil Laws), Socialist Law (Others) ; we skip one 
root – choosing the Socialist Laws, as the least significant from an economic point of view – to 
avoid multicollinearity problems. 
11   La Porta et al. (1999). On the endowment view, also see Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001). 
12   The country sample depends on the availability of institutional data. Given the 267 world countries 
(UN members are 180), our 48 countries represent 54 percent of world GDP and 30 percent of the 
world population.  
  22Another possible proxy of the reputation endowment effect and/or the bureaucracy 
effect could be the age of the central bank. We employ an index of central bank age 
(CBAGE Index) utilizing the information provided on the central bank web sites. For 
each central bank the value of the index is simply equal to the years between the 
central bank establishment and today. If a relationship between age and reputation 
and/or bureaucratic power holds, the higher CBAGE Index, the higher the reputation 
endowment and/or the specific bureaucratic power of the central bank.  
Table 4 shows the Logit and Probit estimates of the general specification with the 
new variable – CBAGE Index – using the same sample. The central bank age does not 
matter: the probability of a more consolidated supervision is not linked with the age of 
the monetary authorities.  
Finally, it is crucial to test the robustness of the hypothesis that the central bank 
involvement can be considered an independent variable, rejecting any reverse 
causality. In other words, we had to reject the hypothesis that central bank involvement 
is endogenous, i.e. that the policymaker jointly determines the financial supervision 
level and the central bank involvement, based on the same explicative model. We then 
considered central bank involvement as dependant variable (Table 5). Our conclusion 
is that the variables that could explain the degree of central bank involvement in 
financial supervision do not coincide with those that we use to analyse the degree of 
consolidation. In fact, if one performs Logit and Probit regressions using CBFA as 
dependent variable and the same vector of financial and institutional variables, the 
results are not significant at all.  
Furthermore, to test the robustness of the institutional factor, we tried changing the 
index of central bank involvement, making it perfectly symmetrical with the index of 
financial supervision level
13 (Table 6). As expected, all the results are confirmed.  
Finally, looking at the control variables, the probability that a country will 
move towards a Single Authority model is higher: 1)  the  smaller the overall size of 
the economy; 2) the higher the goodness of public governance; 3) when the jurisdiction 
                                                 
13   The different levels of central bank involvement can be measured using the identical scale of the 
FAC Index (labelled CBFA Two Index): 1 = the central bank has responsibility in no sector; 3 = the 
central bank has responsibility in one sector; 5 = the central bank has responsibility in two sectors; 7 
= the central bank has responsibility in all three sectors. 
  23adopt the Civil Law, particularly if the legal framework is characterized by German 
and Scandinavian roots
14. 
First of all, the choice of the degree of supervisory unification is influenced by 
the dimension of the economic systems. More specifically, the lower the overall 
economic size, the more likely it seems that the probability of consolidation will 
increase, confirming the hypothesis of policymakers conditioned by the “small country” 
situation
15.  The small country effect captures the fact that with relatively few people 
the expertise in financial supervision is likely to be in short supply, and then this 
expertise might be more effectively utilized if it is concentrated with a single financial 
agency.  
Secondly, the legal factor matters. This law effect is puzzling.  The law and 
finance literature claims the existence of a strong relationship between market oriented 
financial systems and the British law jurisdictions. Here, we do not find that financial 
supervision unification is directly correlated with a market-based regime, while a link 
exists with the Civil Law root, in particular with the German and Scandinavian legal 
systems. This suggests a sort of “legal neighbour” effect.  
Thirdly, the choice of policymakers to establish the concentration of supervisory 
powers could be facilitated by an institutional environment characterized by good 
governance. The relationship between good governance and the supervision 
concentration process can be explained, if we suppose that a policymaker who cares 
about soundness and efficiency would prefer the single financial authority as the 
optimal one in the face of the blurring challenges. 
 
7. Conclusions 
Prior to the present study has there been an attempt to analyse the role of central 
bank monetary regime features in influencing the financial supervision unification. The 
                                                 
14   We contrast the empirical results of Masciandaro (2005), who claimed that - given a different 
sample  of countries (68) – also the financial variables are significant. In Masciandaro (2006) – with 
a data set of 89 countries – the good governance coefficient is weakly significant. Therefore, the 
financial and political factors seem to be sample sensitive explanatory variables. 
15   It has been noted that the small country effect holds. Notwithstanding, we do not include in our 
sample the eight very small countries (Bahrain, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, Maldives, 
Netherlands Antilles, Singapore and United Arab Emirates) that introduce the unified  financial 
authorities. 
  24approach was to consider the supervisory structure with one or more authorities as 
dependent variable. Looking for common determinants in the decision each country 
takes to maintain or reform its supervisory architecture, the empirical analysis 
highlights that the level of financial supervision consolidation depends on the central 
bank involvement in supervision, while the effect of the monetary institutional factors 
– monetary commitment and central bank independence - seem negligible.  
In this respect, the establishment of a single financial authority can be consistent 
with the presence of an independent central bank. On the contrary, in an institutional 
setting characterized by a central bank deeply involved in supervision, a multi-
authorities model seems to be likely to occur. From a European perspective, this results 
in the following prediction: the more the European Central Bank will be involved in 
the financial supervision architecture, the less likely the establishment of a European 
Single Financial Authority will be.  
The overall results are particularly interesting for future research developments, 
bearing the hope that it increases the availability of institutional information, to expand 
the sample of countries that can be analysed. It will be important to pursue a deeper 
analysis of the determinants of the central bank fragmentation effect. In this paper the 
central bank fragmentation effect is an independent variable in explaining the 
supervision unification level. A further step in this field of research will be to consider 
the degree of central bank involvement as a dependent variable, in order to identify 
consistent proxies of the potential different causes (moral hazard effect, bureaucracy 
effect, reputation endowment effect) linked to the past performance of the central 
bankers in the monetary and/or supervisory fields.  
From the theoretical point of view, the future effort will be to model the 
policymaker’s decision framework, in order to better capture the features of the 
institutional and political process that lead a supervisory regime to assume given 
characteristics. Using the principal agent approach for addressing the architecture of 
financial supervision, this seems a very promising avenue. 
Finally, it will be important to conduct empirical studies aimed at investigating the 
success of different supervisory regimes, estimating the effects the alternative models 
have on key economic variables. Actually such a research immediately is confronted 
with at least two orders of difficulty.  
  25First of all, the issue of the optimal degree of concentration of financial supervisory 
powers has emerged only recently, with the reforms adopted in various countries, so 
considering the type of supervisory regime as an explicative or exogenous (though not 
unique) variable of any other economic phenomenon means undertaking an analysis of 
extremely short historical series, with all the related problems of interpretation. 
Secondly, completely and satisfactorily identifying what the key economic variables 
are, and the most probable object of an estimate, on which a supervisory structure 
makes its effect felt, is not a simple problem. Alternative supervisory structures may, 
for example, affect the level of efficiency of the public resources invested in monitoring 
the financial markets. Indicators can be found for the efficiency phenomenon, and 
empirical analysis can therefore proceed.  
The point is that alternative structures may also (perhaps especially) affect other 
variables that are important but less easily expressed in concise indicators. Examples 
are stability, reputation risk, or confident benefits, or the risk the authority will be 
captured by the policymakers or by the controlled intermediaries. Thus, a complete 
quantitative search for the effects of alternative supervisory structures is now probably 
premature, but it could be implemented in the future.  
  268. Appendix 
8.1 Defining the Degree of Unification in Financial Supervision and the Central 
Bank Involvement  
The creation of the FAC Index is based on an analysis of which and how many 
authorities in 48 countries are empowered to supervise the three traditional sectors of 
financial activity: banking, securities markets, insurance. To transform the qualitative 
information into quantitative indicators, we assigned a numerical value to each type of 
authority, in order to highlight the number of the agencies involved. The rationale with 
which we assigned the values considers simply the concept of unification of 
supervisory powers: the greater the unification, the higher the index value. The index is 
built on the following scale: 7 = Single authority for all three sectors (total number of 
supervisors=1); 5 = Single authority for the banking sector and securities markets (total 
number of supervisors=2); 3 = Single authority for the insurance sector and the 
securities markets, or for the insurance sector and the banking sector (total number of 
supervisors=2) 1 = Independent specialized authority for each sector (total number of 
supervisors=3).  
We assign a value of 3 to the single supervisor for the banking sector and 
securities markets because of the predominant importance of banking intermediation 
and securities markets over insurance in every national financial industry. It also 
interesting to note that, in the group of integrated supervisory agencies countries, it 
seems to be a higher degree of integration between banking and securities supervision 
than between banking and insurance supervision; therefore, the degree of concentration 
of powers is, ceteris paribus, greater. 
These observations do not, however, weigh another qualitative characteristic: 
there are countries in which one sector is supervised by more than one authority. It is 
likely that the degree of concentration rises when two authorities exist in a given 
sector, and one of which has other powers in a second sector. On the other hand, the 
degree of concentration falls when there are two authorities in a given sector, neither of 
which has other powers in a second sector. It would therefore seem advisable to 
include these aspects in evaluating the various national supervisory structures by 
modifying the index as follows: adding 1 if in the country there is at least one sector 
with two authorities, and one of these authorities is also responsible for at least one 
other sector; subtracting 1 if in the country there is at least one sector with two 
authorities assigned to supervision, but none of these authorities has responsibility for 
another sector; 0 elsewhere.  
Furthermore, we should consider the nature of the institutions involved in 
supervisory responsibilities. We propose the index of the central bank's involvement in 
financial supervision: the Central Bank as Financial Authority Index (CBFA). For each 
country, and given the three traditional financial sectors (banking, securities and 
insurance) the CBFA index is equal to: 1 = the central bank has not the main 
responsibility in banking supervision; 2 = the central bank has the responsibility in 
banking supervision; 3 = the central bank has responsibility in two sectors; 4 = the 
central bank has responsibility in all three sectors. 
 
 
  278.2 Defining the Degree Monetary Commitment and Central Bank 
Independence 
To define the monetary commitment and the central bank independence, one 
should be as comprehensive as possible. In the following, we describe 9 criteria 
(consisting of 12 components) proposed in Freytag (2001) that theoretically determine 
the institutional position of the central bank. The first 6 criteria (8 components, 
indicated with a asterisk in Table 1A) are used to build up the index of independence, 
while the overall set of components are utilized for the monetary commitment index. 
1) Stated objectives of monetary policy. A clear definition of the objective of 
monetary policy in the legal foundation of monetary regime, namely price stability, 
makes it easier for the central bank to refuse demands to combat unemployment or to 
finance public spendings via money growth. Thus, commitment varies with the kind 
and number of legally prescribed objectives (component obj).. 
2) Locus of legal commitment. The commitment to stability has to be put into a 
legal framework. This legal framework can be fixed on different constitutional levels. 
The more difficult a change of the regime is for the government, the higher is the 
commitment (component const). 
3) Discretionary power belonging to the government. The more the government 
keeps control over instruments such as exchange rates, interest rates, open market 
policy and so on, the less it commits to stability (component gov). 
4) Conditions of appointment and dismissal of monetary policymakers. First, the 
question is who is able to become chief executive officer (CEO), especially whether 
only a reputed expert or any other person can be appointed (component ceo). Second, 
how is a potential dismissal organised (component diss)?  
5) Conditions of lending to the government. An important factor determining the 
level of legal commitments is a provision on lending fresh money to the government 
(component limcred). Even central bank holding of government bonds purchased on the 
secondary market (component limsec) has fiscal effects as long as the seigniorage is 
added to public revenues. Thus, the level of commitment is the lower, the easier it is for 
the government to borrow money from the monetary institution. 
6) Accountability of the central bank. The level of commitment is higher, the 
better the public is informed about monetary policy (component acc). 
7)  Public pledges of the government. External obligations raise the level of 
commitment (component extern) compared with a situation without these obligations.  
8) Convertibility restrictions. The level of commitment is positively correlated 
with the degree of convertibility (component conv). We distinguish full convertibility of 
all transactions, restricted convertibility for either capital or current account transactions 
or no convertibility at all. A second component (mult) shows whether or not the market 
for foreign exchange is unified. If it is, commitment in this respect is high. 
9) Interactions with other currencies. Monetary competition exerts competitive 
pressure on the domestic monetary authorities to issue a sound currency. The 
permission of monetary competition raises the level of commitment to stability 
(component comp). 
 
  288.3 Sources 
For all the countries we use the official documents and web sites of the central 
banks and the other financial authorities. The information is updated until 2004. See 
also Cukiermann 1992, Cukierman, Miller and Neyapti 2002, Freytag 2001. 




Explanation   Numerical 
codings 
Stated objectives of   obj*  1. Price stability only goal  1.00
monetary policy  (0.1)  2. Other objectives mentioned   0.66
    3. Other objectives equally important   0.33
    4. No goals for monetary policy  0.00
    
Locus of legal   const*  1. Constitution  1.00
commitment  (0.1)  2. Central bank law  0.66
   3.  Decree  0.33
    4. Not fixed at all  0.00
    
Discretionary power   gov*  1. No power left to the government  1.00
belonging to the 
government 
(0.1)  2. Exchange rate only issue to be  
     consulted between government 
0.66
         and monetary authority 
    3. Exchange rate regime completely  0.33
        left to government 
    4. Government may override central 
     bank as regards monetary policy 
0.00
    
Conditions of appoint-   ceo*  1. CEO must be a reputed expert  1.00
ment and dismissal of   (0.05)  2. No expertise demanded  0.00
monetary CEO    
  diss*  1. Appointment with fixed term and   1.00
  (0.05)      dismissal only after criminal  
     offenses and bad performance 
    2. No rules for dismissal  0.50
    3. Dismissal unconditioned or linked 
     to resignation of governments  
     and ministers 
0.00
     
Conditions of lending   limcred*  1. No central bank credit allowed   1.00
to the government  (0.2)  2. Central bank credit allowed  
     conditionally 
0.50
    3. Central bank credit allowed  
     unconditionally 
0.00
     
  limprim*  1. Central bank is not allowed to  1.00
  (0.1)      purchase public bonds on the 
         primary market 
    2. Central bank is allowed to  0.66
        purchase public bonds in hard  
        currency on the primary market 
    3. Central bank is allowed to  0.33
         purchase public bonds in any cur- 
         rency on the primary market 
    4. No limitations on credit activities  0.00
  30(cont.) 
Accountability of the   acc*  1. Obligation to inform the public  1.00
central bank  (0)  2. Obligation to inform the   0.66
        parliament in public hearings 
    3 Obligation to inform the  0.33
        government without publicity 
    4. No accountability  0.00
     
External pledges of   extern  1. Exchange rate fixed to a hard  1.00
the government  (0.1)      currency and money base fully 
        backed with foreign reserves 
    2. Exchange rate fixed  0.75
    3. Crawling peg  0.50
    4. Managed floating  0.25
    5. Free floating  0.00
     
Convertibility   conv  1. Full convertibility  1.00
restrictions  (0.1)  2. Partial convertibility  0.75
    3. Convertibility for current  0.50
        account transactions only 
    4. Convertibility for capital  0.25
        account transactions only 
    5. No convertibility  0.00
    
  mult  1. One exchange rate  1.00
  (0.05  2. Multiple exchange rate  0.00
    
Interactions with   comp  1. A hard currency can be used   1.00
other currencies  (0.05)      for all transactions 
    2. A hard currency can be used   0.66
        for some transactions, others 
    excluded 
    3. A hard currency may be held  0.33
    4. No holdings or transactions in   0.00
        Hard currencies allowed 
The numbers in parenthesis show the weights for the MOC index used in section six. 
 
Source: Freytag (2001, p. 198-199), own changes. 
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1  Argentina  CB  S  I  1  0  1  2 
2  Australia  BI,S  BI,S  BI,S  5  1  6  1 
3  Austria  U, CB  U  U  7  -1  6  1 
4  Belgium  U  U  U  7  0  7  1 
5  Bolivia  B  SI  SI  3  0  3  1 
6  Bosnia  CB,B1,B2  S  I  1  -1  0  2 
7  Brazil  CB  S  CB,I  1  1  2  3 
8  Bulgaria  CB  S  I   1  0  1  2 
9  Canada  BI  Ss(**)  BI  3  0  3  1 
10  Chile  B  SI  SI   3  0  3  1 
11  Croatia  CB  S  I  1  0  1  2 
12  Czech Republic  CB   S  I  1  0  1  2 
13  Denmark  U  U  U  7  0  7  1 
14  Estonia  U  U  U  7  0  7  1 
15  Finland  BS  BS  I  5  0  5  1 
16  France  BC,B1,B2,B3  CB,S  I  1  -1+1  1  3 
17  Germany  U,CB  U  U  7  -1  6  1 
18  Greece  CB  S  I  1  0  1  2 
19  Hong Kong  CB  S  I  1  0  1  2 
20  Hungary  U  U  U  7  0  7  1 
21  Iceland  U  U  U   7  0  7  1 
22  Ireland  CB  CB  CB  7  0  7  4 
23  Israel  CB  S,I  I  1  1  2  2 
24  Italy  CB,S  CB,S  I  1  1  2  3 
25  Japan  U,CB  U  U  7  -1  6  1 
26  Korea  U  U  U  7  0  7  1 
27  Latvia  U  U  U  7  0  7  1 
28  Lithuania  CB  S  I  1  0  1  2 
29  Macedonia  CB  S  -  1  0  1  2 
30  Mexico  BS  BS  I  5  0  5  1 
31  Netherlands  CB,S  CB,S  I,S  1  1  2  3 
32  New Zealand  CB  S  I  1  0  1  2 
33  Nicaragua  U  U  U  7  0  7  1 
34  Norway  U  U  U  7  0  7  1 
35  Peru  BI  S  BI  3  0  3  1 
36  Poland  B  B,S  I1,I2  1  1-1  1  1 
37  Romania  CB  S  I  1  0  1  2 
38  Russia  CB  S  I  1  0  1  2 
39  Slovak Republic  CB  SI  SI  3  -1  2  2 
40  Slovenia  CB  S  I  1  0  1  2 
41  Spain  CB.Bs(**)  CB,S  I  1  1-1  1  3 
42  Sweden  U  U  U  7  0  7  1 
43  Switzerland  BS  BS  I  5  0  5  1 
44  Turkey  B  S  I  1  0  1  1 
45  Ukraine  CB  S  -  1  0  1  2 
46  UK  U  U  U  7  0  7  1 
47  USA  CB,B  S,Ss**  I,Is(**)  1  -1  0  2 
48  Uruguay  BS, BC  BS, BC  I, BC  5  1  6  4 
 
  32The initials have the following meaning: B = authority specialized in the banking sector; BI 
= authority specialized in the banking sector and insurance sector; CB = central bank; G= 
government; I = authority specialized in the insurance sector; S = authority specialized in the 
securities markets; U = single authority for all sectors ; BS = authority specialized in the banking 
sector and securities markets; SI = authority specialized in the insurance sector and securities 
markets. 
(*) (b) = banking or central banking law; (s) = security markets law; (i) = insurance law 
(**) = state or regional agencies 
  33Table 1C: FAC Index, BCFA Index, MOC Index and CBI Index in 48 
Countries 








1 Argentina  1  2  0.803333 0.7475 
2 Australia  6  1  0.408333 0.3525 
3 Austria  6  1  0.7275 0.58125 
4 Belgium  7  1  0.755 0.6225 
5 Bolivia  3  1  0.52 0.395 
6 Bosnia  0  2  0.943333 0.8325 
7 Brazil  2  3  0.36 0.2275 
8 Bulgaria  1  2  0.8875 0.8325 
9 Canada  3  1  0.678333 0.60125 
10 Chile  3  1  0.353333 0.27 
11 Croatia  1  2  0 0 
12 Czech  Republic  1  2  0.755 0.6225 
13 Denmark  7  1  0.554167 0.4775 
14 Estonia  7  1  0.915833 0.8325 
15 Finland  5  1  0.7525 0.6225 
16 France  1  3  0.789167 0.7475 
17 Germany  6  1  0.710833 0.56 
18 Greece  1  2  0.755 0.6225 
19 Hong  Kong  1  2  0.638333 0.54125 
20 Hungary  7  1  0.670833 0.53875 
21 Iceland  7  1  0.63 0.56 
22 Ireland  7  4  0.436667 0.3325 
23 Israel  2  2  0.373333 0.33125 
24 Italy  2  3  0.290833 0.0825 
25 Japan  6  1  0.485 0.31125 
26   Korea  7  1  0.519167 0.435 
27 Latvia  7  1  0.755833 0.67625 
28 Lithuania  1  2  0.7075 0.645 
29 Macedonia  1  2  0.705833 0.71625 
30 Mexico  5  1  0.664167 0.56 
31 Netherlands  2  3  0.443333 0.31125 
32 New  Zealand  1  2  0.526667 0.37375 
33 Nicaragua  7  1  0.61 0.6025 
34 Norway  7  1  0.429167 0.18625 
35 Peru  3  1  0.554167 0.54 
36 Poland  1  1  0.644167 0.45625 
37 Romania  1  2  0.686667 0.645 
38 Russia  1  2  0.554167 0.4775 
39 Slovak  Republic  2  2  0.685833 0.6025 
40 Slovenia  1  2  0.519167 0.395 
41 Spain  1  3  0.761667 0.70625 
42 Sweden  7  1  0.623333 0.51875 
43 Switzerland  5  1  0.3875 0.29 
44 Turkey  1  1  0.588333 0.4975 
45 Ukraine  1  2  0.186667 0.145 
46 UK  7  1  0.415833 0.2075 
47 USA  0  2  0.595833 0.4775 
48 Uruguay  6  4  0.409167 0.27 
  34Table 2  Ordered  Estimates with 
Central Bank Involvement and Monetary Commitment 
 
 
  VARIABLES  Logit I  II  III  IV  Probit I  II  III  IV 
  DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
FAC  FAC    FAC  FAC  FAC    FAC 
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Std. Error 
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  No of observations  48  48  48  48  48  48  48  48 
  LR chi2(5)     34.29     34.00     39.40     39.43         
35.13 
       
33.94 
      40.04        
40.09 
  Prob>chi2  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  Pseudo R2  0.20  0.20  0.23  0.23  0.21  0.20  0.24  0.24 
  Log Likelihood  -65.10  -65.25  -62.55  -62.53  -64.68  -65.28  -62.20  -62.20 
 
Note: *** indicates statistical significance at one percent; ** indicates statistical significance at five 
percent;  * indicates statistical significance at ten percent. 
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  VARIABLES  Logit I  II  III  IV  Probit I  II  III  IV 
  DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
FAC  FAC  FAC  FAC  FAC  FAC  FAC  FAC 
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Coefficient β13 
Std. Error 
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Coefficient β13 
Std. Error 
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  No of observations  48  48  48  48  48  48  48  48 
  LR chi2(5)     34.29     35.72     42.20     42.23         
35.13 
       
35.49 
      42.79        
42.80 
  Prob>chi2  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  Pseudo R2  0.20  0.21  0.25  0.25  0.21  0.21  0.26  0.26 
  Log Likelihood  -65.10  -64.39  -61.15  -61.13  -64.68  -64.50  -60.85  -60.85 
 
 
Note: *** indicates statistical significance at one percent; ** indicates statistical significance at five 
percent; * indicates statistical significance at ten percent. 
  38 Table 4 Ordered Estimates with 
Central Bank Involvement and Central Bank Age 
 
 
  VARIABLES  Logit I  II  III  Probit I  II  III 
  DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
FAC  FAC  FAC  FAC  FAC  FAC 

























  CBAGE 
Coefficient β13 
Std. Error 
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  CBFACBAGE 
Coefficient β13 
Std. Error 
                     P >z 
     
-0.00008 
(0.0033) 
     0.98 
     
-0.0002 
(0.001) 
     0.89 
               










































































































































































































































































































































  No of observations  48  48  48  48  48  48 
  LR chi2(5)     34.29  30.50  34.30         35.13  30.98  35.14 
  Prob>chi2  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  Pseudo R2  0.20  0.18  0.20  0.21  0.18  0.21 




Note: *** indicates statistical significance at one percent; ** indicates statistical significance at five 
percent; * indicates statistical significance at ten percent. 
  40Table 5 Ordered Estimates with 
Different Dependant Variable: Central Bank Involvement  
 
  VARIABLES  Logit (a)  Probit (a) 
  DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
CBFA  CBFA 















       












































































































































  No of observations  48  48 
  LR chi2(5)  32.16  29.23 
  Prob>chi2  0.00  0.00 
  Pseudo R2  0.30  0.27 
  Log Likelihood  -37.31  -38.78 
 
 
Note: *** indicates statistical significance at one percent; ** indicates statistical significance at five 
percent; * indicates statistical significance at ten percent.  (a)   9 observations completely 




  42Table 6 Ordered Estimates with 
Different Independent Variable: Central Bank Involvement  
 
  VARIABLES  Logit   Probit  
  DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
FAC  FAC 















       














































































































































  No of observations  48  48 
  LR chi2(5)     34.29         35.13 
  Prob>chi2  0.00  0.00 
  Pseudo R2  0.20  0.21 
  Log Likelihood  -65.10  -64.68 
 
 
Note: *** indicates statistical significance at one percent; ** indicates statistical significance at five 








Table 7 Correlation Matrix 
 
  CBFA  MOC  CBI  CBICUK  CBAGE 
CBFA  1         
MOC  -0.1650  1       
CBI  -0.1424  0.9621  1     
CBAGE  -01284  0.0088  -0.0489  -0.3671  1 
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